In recent decades, public health policy and practice have been increasingly challenged by globalization, even as global financing for health has increased dramatically. This article discusses globalization and its health challenges from a vantage of political science, emphasizing increased global flows (of pathogens, information, trade, finance, and people) as driving, and driven by, global market integration. This integration requires a shift in public health thinking from a singular focus on international health (the higher disease burden in poor countries) to a more nuanced analysis of global health (in which health risks in both poor and rich countries are seen as having inherently global causes and consequences). Several globalization-related pathways to health exist, two key ones of which are described: globalized diseases and economic vulnerabilities. The article concludes with a call for national governments, especially those of wealthier nations, to take greater account of global health and its social determinants in all their foreign policies.
INTRODUCTION: FROM INTERNATIONAL HEALTH TO GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
Consuela's story is a stylized but evidencebased (71, 97, 117) account that weaves together many of the ways in which contemporary globalization is affecting public health (see sidebar, Global Flows). In keeping with dominant trends in the emerging field of critical globalization studies (6) , our emphasis in this article is on globalization as " [a] pattern of transnational economic integration animated by the ideal of creating self-regulating global markets for goods, services, capital, technology, and skills" (45) . This definition does not assume away such phenomena as the increased speed with which information about new treatments, technologies, and strategies for public health can be diffused or the opportunities for political participation and social inclusion that are potentially offered by new forms of electronic communication. However, in contrast to simply descriptive accounts, we consider the economics of globalization to be its driving force. The globalization of culture, for example, is inseparable from the emergence of a network of transnational mass media corporations that dominate distribution and content provision through the allied sports, cultural, and consumer product industries. Relatedly, global promotion of brands such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's is both a cultural phenomenon and an economic one, driven by the opportunity to expand profits and markets even as it contributes to the "global production of diet" (25) , increasing obesity and its health consequences in much of the developing world. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, as a contrasting example, saw state and nonstate actors negotiate the first international public health law, albeit one without enforcement measures, which aims to reduce the harms associated with a toxic product whose production and marketing are global in scale and scope (80) . Economic interests in the global tobacco trade chipped away at its provisions, and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (which allow companies, including tobacco multinationals, to sue governments for infringements of the "intellectual property rights" of their logos through cigarette plain-packaging or warning-label requirements) could put a chill in governments' compliance with its protocols (8, 99) .
The approach taken to situate public health policy and practice 1 in their worldwide context has historically shifted between two conceptual positions: international and global (14) . The first was driven by the concern of wealthier nations with disease risks in poorer countries. Its origins extend back to medieval efforts to halt the spread of infection that accompanied the movement of goods and people.
In the context of an earlier wave of globalization in the mid-to late-nineteenth century, many colonial governments and corporate philanthropies began to fund basic public health measures in developing countries as a way to counteract the spread of infectious disease (13) . Motivations were complex, embracing political and economic interests, reducing cross-border contagion or risks to colonizer-country nationals working abroad, and faith-based ideals of charity or missionary-led conversion. Similar interests underpin, at least in part, the contemporary rise of health in foreign policy discourse, but with a shift in nomenclature to "global health." Koplan and colleagues (72) trace global health's "fashionable" status to a fusion of international health's disciplinary base in tropical medicine with public health's roots in population-wide intervention and social reform. However, contemporary concern with global health also has strong connections with social movements concerned primarily with the effects of market-driven (neoliberal) global economic policies, notably those associated with extended intellectual property rights (and their negative impact on access to essential medicines), increased commercialization/cost-recovery in health care systems (promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the wake of structural adjustment programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s), and increased pressures for trade openness (which can reduce the policy from superiors that define the universe of actions available to practitioners). Public health policy in the context of this chapter also, however, includes a variety of activities outside the health sector, for instance including choices related to trade, investment, and migration.
space and capacity for public health reforms, affecting low-income countries in particular). Regardless of origins, two axioms distinguish global health as a conceptual basis for research, policy, and practice from its international predecessor: recognition of global
Global flows:
Globalization is associated with a number of flows that have direct and indirect effects on health.
Increased pathogen flows:
Whether it is the risk of drug-resistant tuberculosis or pandemic influenza, the movement of people means the transport of pathogens. SARS was a wake-up call to a somnambulant public health community and the spark for new International Health Regulations and multilateral health collaborations. Global trade, another ancient vector of disease, poses other health risks, from the spread of pests to that of pestilence: It was a freighter's dumping of infected bilge waters that caused the Latin American cholera pandemic of the 1990s (73) .
Increased information flows:
Advances in computing and telecommunications have shaped modern globalization, increasing the spread of health knowledge and technological innovation, the reach of multinational firms, and the rise of contesting social movements. But despite the global spread of interconnectivity, access to the information superhighway remains highly skewed. Most people in high-income countries are connected, but scarcely 1 in 100 Africans are (119) , where the costs of broadband access (adjusted for per-capita income) can be 170 times greater than in the United States (128) .
Increased trade flows:
The accelerated flow of traded goods and services enabled by economic integration has created new sources of wealth and health for some. But patterns of production and exchange, along with labor market changes, have left many vulnerable to employment insecurity, insufficient health and safety protections, and environmental degradation. In addition, the energy requirements of global production chains, and the fossil fuels used in transportation, are now among the fastest-growing sectoral contributors to climate change emissions (84) .
Increased financial flows:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the more recent rise of outsourced contract production have reorganized production across national borders, in the process creating a genuinely global labor market that increases economic inequality and the insecurity of many workers. FDI flows have now been dwarfed by shortterm financial flows, with far-reaching consequences not only for health but for the power to implement policies that protect and enhance health.
Increased people flows:
Migration, long a defining feature of globalization and the pursuit of greater opportunity, is driven increasingly by economic and environmental necessity (121) . Rich-country borders remain open to the best and the brightest but are revolving doors for workers with limited credentials, especially in the wake of the 2008 global recession. economic interconnectedness as both cause and consequence of the distribution of international disease burdens, and a parallel recognition that many of the pressing health issues facing nations are now inherently transnational if not global, not only because of cross-border disease threats, but also because conditions of life and work that increase vulnerability to disease and affect access to preventive and treatment services are inseparable from global distributions of power, wealth, and resources (78) . A further dimension is added by the expansion of research on social determinants of health (SDH), much of which was consolidated in 2008 by a World Health Organization commission on the topic (30; see also the article by Marmot & Friel in this volume (50) ]. The insight that people's health is affected by their conditions of life and work is hardly new; public health activism around these conditions has a long if episodic history dating back at least to the Industrial Revolution. However, expansion of the evidence base means that public health policy and practice must now respond to the multiple channels of influence that connect global forces and processes to health by way of the SDH (15, 76) . We return to this point later in the article.
GLOBALIZATION'S NEW CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC HEALTH
Although many SDH exist, in the global context "the most devastating problems that plague the daily lives of billions of people . . . emerge from a single, fundamental source: the consequences of poverty and inequality" (96, p. 12) . Over the long term and with considerable variation at any given income level, richer societies are healthier (35, 126) , whereas poverty, however defined, remains one of the most important contributing conditions to ill health. Thus, if globalization could be shown to be reliable and effective in increasing growth rates and reducing poverty, setting aside for the moment the health-negative environmental impacts of such growth, then measures to promote globalization, such as trade liberalization, should be embraced for their health benefits (47) . The evidence that globalization contributes either to economic growth or to poverty reduction, however, is at best equivocal, depending inter alia on how one assesses the extent to which national economies have been integrated into the global marketplace, how poverty is defined, and how many uncertainties about data quality one is willing to live with or overlook (68) . Even globalization's enthusiasts concede that there may be substantial numbers of losers within national economies, notably as a consequence of changes in labor markets.
In the past quarter-century of rapid economic integration, although the size of the global work force doubled as India, China, and the transition economies opened their borders to trade and investment, progress toward poverty reduction in low-and middle-income countries was modest. According to World Bank analyses, between 1981 and 2005 the number of people living in extreme poverty declined by 505 million (24) . This decline is accounted for entirely by economic growth in China, where half of the poverty reduction occurred before that country embraced domestic or global market reforms (23 Figures 1 and 2) . As one senior World Bank development economist concluded, "it is hard to maintain the view that expanding external trade is . . . a powerful force for poverty reduction in developing countries" (101). It is also worth noting that povertyreducing growth in China-and in some other countries such as Vietnam-coincided with the rapid marketization of health care provision, leading to dramatic declines in access and affordability (41, 107, 115, 123) , and much of the progress in development and poverty reduction that occurred over the period in question may have been undone by the recession that began in 2008 as a direct consequence of the interconnectedness of global financial markets.
Economic growth and poverty reduction are not the whole global health story. The global diffusion of new health knowledge and technologies may have done more to improve health status in developing countries in the last half of the past century than did economic growth per se (37) . Many of these innovations originated in wealthy countries, and "in this sense, the first world has been responsible for producing the global public goods of medical and health-related research and development from which everyone has benefited, in poor and nowrich countries alike" (36, p. 99) . This transfer of knowledge is now compromised by the extension of intellectual property rights held mostly by firms based in high-income countries. Newly available employment opportunities for women in export-oriented industries provide opportunities for them to earn income outside patriarchal social structures and are another claimed, if indirect, health benefit of globalization. But employment conditions in such industries are often so directly destructive of health, partly because of retailers' relentless pressure to cut costs and deliver new products quickly (2, 3, 5) , that-in the case of Bangladeshi garment factories, for instance-"it would not be possible to undertake such work for an extended period of time" (67) .
An innovative econometric exercise carried out as background research for the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, using data from 136 countries, helps in assessing the overall impact of globalization. Cornia and colleagues (32) described five main influences on mortality: material deprivation, psychological stress, unhealthy lifestyles, inequality and lack of social cohesion, and technical (i.e., medical) progress. They then identified a range of variables that affect these influences, classifying the variables as (a) related to policy choices made in the context of globalization (e.g., income inequality, immunization rates); (b) endogenous, and therefore unrelated to globalization for purposes of the analysis (medical progress); or (c) describable as "shocks" (e.g., wars and natural disasters, HIV/AIDS). The final stage of analysis was a simulation that compared trends in life expectancy at birth (LEB) over the period 1980-2000 with those that would be predicted based on a counterfactual in which trends in all the relevant variables remained at the 1980 value or continued the trend they followed over the pre-1980 period. Thus, investigators assumed in the counterfactual (for instance) not only that income distribution within countries, one of the globalization-related variables, did not change over the period 1980-2000, but also that no progress occurred in medical technology and that HIV incidence remained at its 1980 level.
The results of this simulation indicated that, on a worldwide basis, over the period 1980-2000 globalization canceled out most of the progress toward better health (as measured by LEB) that occurred as a consequence of diffusion of medical progress, and the effects of shocks (wars, natural disasters, and AIDS) combined with globalization to result in a www.annualreviews.org • Globalization and Public Healthslight worldwide decline in LEB as compared with the counterfactual. The most conspicuous declines in life expectancy occurred in the transition economies, where globalization accounted for essentially the entire decline, and sub-Saharan Africa, where globalization contributed almost as much as the AIDS epidemic to a decline of nearly nine years in LEB relative to the counterfactual. Although cautious about inferring causation, the authors conclude that "the negative association found between liberalization-globalization policies, poor economic performance and unsatisfactory health trends . . . seems to be robust" (32, p. 58) . Even when health gains were achieved, they were often less substantial than they would have been under an alternative set of economic and political conditions in which the gains from growth were distributed more widely.
KEY PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS ARISING FROM GLOBALIZATION
The above is a broad-brush overview. We focus now on two key public health concerns: globalized diseases, which reflect public health's historical legacy but with a global dimension, and economic vulnerabilities, associated with three decades of global market integration.
Globalized Diseases
Communicable diseases persist despite the optimistic belief that they could be conquered in even the poorest countries by a combination of antimicrobial agents, vaccines, and good sanitary practices (11). Indeed, not only have new infectious diseases emerged (e.g., HIV/AIDS, Ebola, SARS) but familiar ones have returned (e.g., tuberculosis, cholera), in each case with the burden falling almost entirely on poor countries (51, 66, 79, 87) . These trends can be partly attributed to the false assumptions by the international public health community that microbes were stationary agents and that diseases could be sequestered within a specified geographical boundary (52, 87) . The forces of globalization have illuminated how misplaced these assumptions were, as we are increasingly "dealing with global rather than local or national epidemiology" (59, p. 1747).
The increase in human mobility has accelerated the speed and distance at which microbes are able to travel, while urbanization-which in some contexts is accelerated by globalization's effects on rural livelihoods-has facilitated the spread of infectious diseases. Historically, infectious diseases such as the plague, smallpox, and cholera have spread owing to human migrations associated with trade, military campaigns, and religious pilgrimages (22, 28, 29) . With modern transportation, pathogens can spread faster and in a less uniform pattern. One simulation assessed what would happen if the 1968-1969 Hong Kong influenza strain returned with air travel volumes at 2000 levels (56). The authors found that the pandemic would spread quicker and have a wider reach, with cumulative reported cases being 188% greater. Travel and migration are not the only global factors influencing infectious diseases. Major international public goods for health, notably communicable disease control (including vaccination) and control of antibiotic resistance but also disease surveillance, are conspicuously undersupplied by today's economic institutions (7), reflecting the "dramatic decay in local and global public health capacity" identified by a United Nations panel (106). And increasing evidence indicates that climate change is playing a role in the spread of infectious diseases: Rising temperatures will increase transmission rates of vector-and rodent-borne diseases, including malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis (22, 29, 31, 33) .
Increased research and policy attention is being paid to the globalization of infectious diseases, including development of increasingly sophisticated tools to model their spread (28) . Meanwhile, chronic noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes have been steadily growing in prevalence and now account for the largest proportion of the global burden of disease (132) , even outpacing infectious diseases in all developing countries except for those in sub-Saharan Africa. To this "double burden of disease" must be added the rising incidence of injuries, not only road traffic accidents but also work-related injuries and illnesses (see sidebar, Globalization and Death on the Job), crime, and the health damage and social and economic dislocation that occur in zones of war and intrastate conflict (81, 113) . Recent literature (16, 83) now refers to triple burdens of disease because of distinctive challenges presented by rapid increases in injuries, or even quadruple burdens, because of the special challenge presented by HIV both for health systems and for social policy (see Figure 3 , color insert, for the South African case).
Public health policy and practice at the international level have been slow to respond to NCDs, and the emphasis continues to be placed on communicable disease control. Glasgow (53) has identified two main reasons for this trend. First, although the incidence of communicable diseases has captured the attention of political scientists in general and international relations experts in particular, NCDs have little role in either high or low politics (see Table 1 ). The "securitization" of HIV/AIDS (92, 93) is especially notable; concerns include the disproportionate prevalence of HIV among security forces, the potential role of peacekeepers as a vector of HIV transmis-
GLOBALIZATION AND DEATH ON THE JOB
The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in the United States in 1911, in which 148 workers died, led to a public outcry and eventually to improved safety standards; similar fires occur with some frequency today in Bangladeshi garment factories (17) . When the tankers and freighters that are indispensable elements of the global reorganization of production have reached the end of their useful lives, they are no longer dismantled in high-income countries, and instead broken up by casual workers in Bangladesh who are routinely exposed to carcinogenic substances and the risks of explosion (18) . During the early stages of its extraordinarily rapid (if authoritarian) industrialization, South Korea had "a higher industrial accident rate than any other industrialized or rapidly industrializing country" (86) ; today, that dubious honor is held by China (82) . However, for many low-and middle-income countries serious data limitations exist with respect to the full extent of work-related injury and illness (60) . sion, the economic strain and the social fragmentation of the disease on countries, and its potential use as a weapon of war via rape (43, 94) . Second, the rise in NCDs in low-and middle-income countries is partly attributable to global trade and investment policies and practices that are globalizing Western lifestyles, including increased consumption of unhealthy products. For example, the nutrition transition in low-and middle-income countries-the shift toward a high-energy diet (containing animal protein, saturated fats, sugars, and highly processed food) and higher levels of inactivityis occurring much faster and at earlier stages of development than it did in high-income countries (100). Although urbanization is part of the explanation, increasing evidence connects the speed of the nutrition transition with the global reach of transnational food corporationsfacilitated by liberalized trade and investment regimes-into both processing, marketing, and retailing (25, 55, 61, 62, 75) . Increased trade in tobacco and alcohol products is associated with higher levels of consumption and health-related problems (57, 116) , at the same time that trade and investment treaties appear to be eroding the policy space for governments to intervene through restrictions on advertising, points of sale, taxation, and other measures now widely accepted in domestic public health practice as essential tools in health promotion.
Economic Vulnerabilities
One of globalization's most substantial impacts on population health arises from its tendency to increase economic inequality, insecurity, and vulnerability (12, 114) . This process operates through at least four distinct but closely interconnected dynamics. First, production has been reorganized across multiple national borders through foreign direct investment and outsourcing to independent contractors. This process was facilitated both by technology-driven reductions in transportation and communication costs and by the lowering of institutional barriers to trade and investment, in the form of both the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and a proliferation of bilateral and regional treaties. A genuinely global labor market has gradually begun to emerge (104, 127) , although it involves mainly the mobility of capital across national borders in search of lower wages and more flexible working arrangements rather than the mobility of workers themselves. An important element of this process has been the integration of India, China, and the transition economies of the former Soviet bloc into the global marketplace, roughly doubling the number of workers competing for jobs as diverse as electronics assembly and computer technical support, which are increasingly independent of location, and according to some observers providing worldwide downward pressure on wages (49, 125) . The tendency of globalization to increase economic inequality by way of its effects on labor markets is now conceded even by the World Bank (129), which is generally a reliable cheerleader; it arises not only from downward pressure on the wages of those whose skills are in abundant supply, but also from the extent to which those with internationally marketable credentials or skills that are valuable to corporate employers can increasingly command incomes defined by the global marketplace rather than national labor market conditions. Shifts in the share of national income accruing to capital rather than labor, which have been quite pronounced in some countries (65, 125), magnify this effect.
Second, domestic and international deregulation of financial markets has increased the volume of short-term financial flows and the speed with which investors can move money into-and out of-national economies. Whereas the total value of foreign direct investment (to acquire shares in existing companies or build new facilities) in 2008 was $1.7 trillion, the daily value of foreign exchange transactions on the world's financial markets was estimated at $3.2 trillion in 2007, the most recent year for which figures are available at this writing (105). The effect, again, is to increase economic insecurity. Rapid disinvestment as hot money flows out of a country can reduce the value of national currencies by 50% or more and drive millions of people into poverty and economic insecurity; such crises occurred in Mexico in 1994-1995, several South Asian countries in 1997-1998, and Argentina in 2001 (105) . Often, inequality is further increased by the ability of the wealthy to shift their assets abroad in anticipation of a crisis; insecurity is compounded by the public spending cuts necessary to restore the confidence of financial markets and by the tendency of employment to recover more slowly than gross domestic product in the aftermath of financial crises (122). The actual or anticipated reaction of financial markets can limit the social policy options available to national governments, enabling the world's wealthy to impose "implicit conditionalities" (58) . For example, concern about redistributive policies that might be adopted by Brazil's Workers' Party (PT), which by 1999 appeared likely to win the 2002 election, led major U.S. financial institutions to warn clients against investing in Brazil. Responding to a process of disinvestment that drove the value of Brazil's currency down by more than 60% relative to the U.S. dollar between January 1999 and July 2002, the PT "chose to suffer low growth, high unemployment and flat levels of social expenditure rather than risk retribution from the global financial actors who constitute 'the markets'," in the words of noted development scholar Peter Evans (44) . The financial crisis that began in 2008 emphasized the vulnerabilities associated with global financial volatility and showed that they are not restricted to others, at least in a geographic sense, but rather penetrate the economies of the world's richest countries.
Third, the combined pressures of reorganized production and deregulated finance create credibility for the claim that neoliberal or "market fundamentalist" (109) principles for the organization of economic and social policy are justified on pragmatic grounds: They appear to be the only ones that work (48) . Especially in high-income countries, it can be difficult to assess the extent to which the appeal to global constraints functions as a rhetorical device to further domestic class interests. Some of the most destructive policies in terms of increasing economic inequality and insecurity cannot plausibly be attributed to globalization, but rather reflect a shift in domestic values. The U.S. welfare "reforms" enacted in 1996, which had the effect if not the intent of exacerbating the social consequences of deindustrialization, dramatically expanding the low-wage labor force and increasing its vulnerability to exploitation by removing an already flimsy social safety net, are one case in point (124, pp. 41-109) . However, one may consider the diffusion of neoliberal policy wisdom incubated, in part, in the United States, and then actively promoted by the governments of G7 countries through such institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as itself an element of globalization because of the reach of those institutions (see e.g., 9). For purposes of public health policy and practice, then, it is sufficient to recognize that globalization routinely contributes to increases in economic inequality, that global influences may (now) constrain the range of feasible policy responses, and that powerful domestic interests are likely to appeal to the imperatives of competing in the global marketplace as they oppose the redistributive policies that are central to public health responses to globalization.
Finally, there is migration. Although capital can move across borders with minimal restrictions in search of more flexible labor market regimes or lower-cost contract producers, the mobility of workers across borders is drastically stratified, depending on the relative scarcity or abundance of their credentials, and their global marketability. Of special concern for public health practice is the situation of expanding populations of workers who may be driven from their countries or regions of origin either by changing labor market conditions that are directly traceable to globalization (as in the case of Mexican or Central American migrants in the United States) or for other reasons, at least superficially unrelated to globalization, such as intensified ethnic or religious conflict in their home countries. Cross-border labor flows have become especially important to meeting "global" families' health and welfare needs health issues (postmigration) of vulnerable migrants living in host countries (typically in high-income  countries). Sources: 10, 19, 21, 39, 40, 54, 69, 91, 108, 110, 112, 120 Undocumented migrants tend to be economic migrants from poor countries. They tend to live in poor environments and work in hazardous jobs with unsafe conditions and are generally underpaid (less than minimum wage) without social benefits. Owing to their limited income and their fear of detection by authorities, undocumented migrants are likely to delay or to not seek health care when faced with an illness.
economic impacts of the recession that began in 2008 (20, 131) . The main postmigration health issues for these vulnerable groups of migrants are detailed in Table 2 . Regardless of the nature of the factors driving emigration, such workersamong whom women are disproportionately represented-routinely occupy subaltern positions in global "survival circuits" (103) . The precariousness of the employment status of unauthorized Mexican and Central American workers in the United States, for example, is both ensured and compounded by their lack of access to legal protection; lack of access to health care magnifies this vulnerability. Although most research has addressed the health of migrants living in wealthier host countries, other effects can also heighten the vulnerability of communities of departing migrants. This includes the migration of health professionals (26, 133) 
GLOBALIZATION'S CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
The 2008 report of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health consolidated an impressive body of research that demonstrated the importance of upstream influences on health, notably those related to economic deprivation and gender inequality. However, it is fair to say that public health research, policy, and practice, at least in the Anglo-American world, have been slow to respond to this evidence; most attention still focuses on notions of individual responsibility and lifestyle change. This pattern is gradually changing, as evident, for example, in the increased attention being paid to the limited availability of a healthy diet in many low-income urban neighborhoods; however, a behavioral emphasis remains. Addressing the public health challenges presented by globalization will require a consistent willingness to consider influences on public health that operate at the levels of social structure and social stratification (compare Reference 95) . British journalist Nick Cohen described an important consequence of globalization when he commented that "the gulf between the poor and the rich world doesn't run between countries but within them" (27, p. 293). In the United States, a study that compared health status with demographic characteristics at the county level found that the life expectancy of African Americans in high-risk urban counties is almost nine years shorter than that of the mostly white residents of Middle America (89, 90) ; "tens of millions of Americans are experiencing levels of health that are more typical of middle-income or low-income developing countries" (90, p. 9) . This study was completed before the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, as a result of which millions more Americans lost their health insurance; by 2009 more than one million schoolchildren were homeless or at imminent risk of homelessness, and one in four children lived in a household that was receiving federally funded food vouchers, or "food stamps" (38, 42) . In many countries regardless of their income levels, austerity programs that will be demanded (by domestic constituencies or global financial markets) to reduce the deficits that have resulted from revenue losses from the financial crisis, and the
SOCIAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON DEPARTURE COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF NOPAL VERDE
Nopal Verde 2 is a town in the northern desert of Mexico, known for its "contagion," a term given for the out-migration that began in the early 1990s and intensified in 1995 following the agricultural crisis. Although there has been some out-migration in this town since before the Mexican revolution (1917) (1918) (1919) , the rate of migration to the United States has risen so high that the town now lacks any solid productive base, surviving only on remittances. This has had a number of consequences on the community. Those who continue to live year-round in the town tend to be older and the least capable of engaging in agriculture and other labor. The health clinic is unable to adequately monitor the population, which is constantly shifting. This fact creates logistical problems: For example, the nurse-practitioner has difficulties deciding how much vaccine she should order each year to immunize the children. There is insufficient critical mass to have a real community; family and friends feel abandoned, whereas children are left with no one to play with. Young people have also lost any ambition for college or technical training because they are all anxious to get to al otro lado (the other side). These changing attitudes have been referred to by Mexican education experts as descolarización or deschooling. The average number of years spent in school has been declining; as Esteban, a university student (who was the only one of his cohort from high school to stay and continue with his education), stated, his friends view education as a "ticket to nowhere" (63) .
costs of bailouts and stimulus packages to offset its effects, may have long-term consequences not only for population health, but also for the perceived feasibility of meaningful policy initiatives.
This example suggests the difficulty that public health policy and practice face in coming to grips with large-scale socioeconomic trends of the kind generated and influenced by globalization. Generically, to counteract the tendency of the global marketplace to magnify economic inequalities that threaten health, states must be able to mobilize substantial resources for directly and indirectly redistributive purposes and to regulate the behavior of powerful economic actors such as transnational corporations (34) . In many cases, relevant policy instruments are administratively outside the control of professionals or agencies with primary responsibility for public health, creating a need for intersectoral action that will, first of all, require convincing agencies of government without a health-related mandate to take seriously the health consequences of policy in such areas as labor markets and taxation. This is more than a matter of finding convincing evidence, which itself requires reflection on what standard of proof is necessary or appropriate. In some cases, those agencies may have created the problems they are now being asked to help solve, for example, by deregulating labor markets or weakening social protection.
Issues of scale are likely to compound the difficulties. A municipal public health department may be well aware that it is arithmetically impossible to eat a healthy diet while paying market rent on the income available through public assistance, even though neither it nor any other agency at the municipal government can do much to improve the availability of affordable housing or to increase income support levels (118) . In many low-and middle-income countries, health and access to health care have been adversely affected by macroeconomic orthodoxy demanded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, effectively shifting the locus of policy-making outside a country's borders altogether. Arguably, the operation of international financial markets creates a similar constraint, leading one of the most accomplished observers of such markets to warn that "those societies most in need of egalitarian redistribution may have, in terms of external financial market pressures, the most difficulty achieving it" (88, p. 90) . Against this background, special difficulties for public health responses to globalization at the national level are presented by the process that international relations scholar Richard Falk has described as "the social disempowerment of the state [that] follows from the impact of neoliberal ideas, reinforced by arguments about competitiveness in more closely linked regional and world markets" (46, p. 23) .
CONCLUSION: GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY AND THE GRAND CHALLENGE OF HEALTHIER FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE
[T]o protect the health of its population, harness the benefits of globalisation, and make the most of its contribution to health and development across the world, [we need] to have a clear, coherent and co-ordinated approach to the many issues that influence global health. (64).
Public health activism in the nineteenth century mobilized around the health consequences of hazards, inequities, and exploitations that were the collateral damage, if not the intended logic, of European industrialization. This activism quickly internationalized, but remained focused on the policies and politics of the (then still fairly new) Westphalian-modeled nation states. Such health activism within national borders is as much needed today as it was a century and a half ago; but as we have argued in this article, globalization processes have now rendered health an inherently global concern.
This concern has been met, in part, by the increasing prominence of health in foreign policy discourse. In 2007, the foreign ministers of seven countries (Norway, France, Brazil, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand) issued the Oslo Declaration identifying global health as "a pressing foreign policy issue of our time" (85). Several other countries before, or since, have issued unilateral statements on global health policy; the idea that governments should consider health seriously within their foreign policy became an official United Nations General Assembly Resolution in late 2008, and health system strengthening became at least temporarily a major element of the G8 policy agenda (102) . Such developments formalize a trend that has seen a dramatic rise in global financing for health accompanied by a proliferation of global health initiatives (such as the Global Fund), financing schemes (UNITAID, the airline tax that finances antiretroviral drugs for poor countries), and new private players, notably the Gates Foundation (98) . There is even a new movement combining academia and bureaucracy under the rubric of global health diplomacy, a term used to describe the processes by which government, multilateral, and civil society actors attempt to position health higher in foreign policy negotiations and to create new forms of global governance for health.
If health has become inherently global, so, too, must the efforts of public health advocates and policy-makers. The challenge is one of creating greater foreign policy coherence around the pathways that affect global health equity and resolving intractable conflicts between the priorities implied by a focus on health equity and the traditional preoccupations of foreign policy (and the economic interests of national and global elites). As far back as the 1969 Pearson Commission, which launched the concept of an obligation to provide development assistance, a Commission staff member warned that "it is futile . . . to nullify the effects of increased aid by inconsiderate trade policies" [Pearson et al. (1969) , as cited in 70]. That caution has not been well heeded. Development assistance, including that for health, still tends to be driven more by the strategic and economic interests of donors than by the health needs of those facing the greatest burden of disease (98, 111) . Although jurisprudence from WTO dispute resolution panels is slowly allowing more exceptions for health, most high-income governments continue to pursue extended intellectual property rights, reductions in developing-country tariffs, liberalized trade in services, open competition on government contracts, and bilateral investment treaties (which allow corporations to sue noncompliant governments directly), all of which have been shown to affect health negatively (74, 77) . A recent review of global health policy initiatives by different governments shows mixed results at best, with national security (border protection against disease) and economic security (partly through trade) dominating other arguments for why health should have greater weight in foreign policy negotiations. Table 3 summarizes some of these arguments and what they imply for the new public health role of global health diplomacy.
Notwithstanding the default to a high politics of national and economic security in most (though not all) nations' foreign policy decisions, there remains some cause for optimism that global health will retain its prominence in foreign policy. Spain's presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2010 focused on issues of global health equity, coherence, and knowledge; post-2008, the director-general of the World Health Organization frequently emphasized the health risks of unregulated global financial markets; and the transition from the G8 to the G20, although still fraught with issues of economic elitism in global governance, incorporates some countries with strong histories of rights-based approaches to health. Global health may be well-positioned to influence how globalization re-emerges from its present economic crisis; but how well it accomplishes this will be determined in part by the capacities and skills of global public health diplomats and by which of the policy arguments they choose to emphasize. The challenges acquire urgency if the financial crisis of 2008 represents not an isolated perturbation but rather a manifestation of a "triple crisis" (1) that involves at least partly interconnected patterns of economic volatility, food price increases, and fossil-fuel dependency/climate change. If this analysis is correct, then research and policy alike will rapidly need to explore the relevant interconnections, their implications for public health, and their origins in national and global power structures. 
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Global public goods
Peace, prevention of pandemics, financial stability, human rights, free access to knowledge, and a stable climate all have characteristics of global (trans-border) public goods that are undersupplied by markets and which require public provision.
Public health interventions are important in reducing the burden of communicable disease and thus constitute a form of global public good. The prevention of pandemic influenza demands international cooperation. Global efforts to reduce the health harms associated with trade in unhealthy products can be pursued through global health conventions (global public goods) such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Funding for public health goods lags behind funding for specific disease interventions. International cooperation on pandemic control rests on mutual benefits, which the use of intellectual property rights (IPRs) can prevent. Global health conventions remain soft law and may still be challenged through enforceable trade and investment treaties.
The concept is well understood by economists, and so may have influence with finance or treasury, but is less well understood by other branches of government or by the popular media. 
Human rights
Human rights treaties have primacy over other international treaties when conflicts arise.
Health is considered a basic right because it is foundational to the enjoyment of most other human rights. States parties are obliged to ensure that their foreign policies, other international treaties into which they enter or negotiate, and nonstate actors within their jurisdiction operating nationally or internationally do not infringe on their own ability, or that of other states, to meet their obligations under human rights treaties.
There is a lack of clarity in how to balance individual rights if they may imperil collective rights. There is no internationally enforceable mechanism for violations of human rights.
Human rights impact analyses of all such foreign policies and international treaty negotiations.
Ethical/moral reasoning
States, the institutions they create, and the persons who function within them are moral actors.
The moral axiom of human dignity not only requires respect for the autonomy of the individual, but also extends to the provision of resources for the capabilities people require to live valued lives. As moral actors, better off states, and those governing them or upholding the global economic institutions that may be shown to sustain inequalities, have obligations for rectification and for change in how such institutions and their policies function.
Moral arguments may hold little sway in the realpolitik of national and economic security, without engagement with arguments from other policy frames. Care must be taken to avoid overgeneralization (assuming universal consensus on a moral principle) and cultural relativism (assuming that historic practice in a given context is a sufficient moral base for its continued acceptance).
Ensure that a moral argument for a foreign policy is present, logically sound, and ethically defensible.
